Opinion- Analysis | By Wondwosen Michago Seide *

Water can defy gravity and flow uphill towards power. Ethiopia uses water to get more power; Egypt uses power to get more water. In the Nile Basin reality, power plays more of a role than cooperation. Though the geographical location of each riparian nation influences its potential utilisation of the Nile River, it is not as decisive as power. In fact, power determines the nature and objective of cooperation. It is the invisible hand that defines and redefines it

Currently, there is a power tug-of-war between upper riparian and lower riparian nations, specifically between Ethiopia and Egypt. For the first time in the history of the Nile Basin, there are indications that the power balance is tilting towards Ethiopia's advantage.

Two kinds of power are at play, hard power and soft power.

Ethiopia uses soft power while Egypt is capitalising on hard power. Many argue that soft power is "an idea whose time has come." Soft power is not weakness but is the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion.

The Nile Basin Council of Ministers met to finalise the Cooperative Framework Agreement at Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, two weeks ago. Unfortunately, but not unexpectedly, they failed to reach a consensus and divided into two major blocks.

Egypt and Sudan vehemently insisted on the historical rights of the Nile water over the New Nile Waters Agreement. On the other hand, the upper riparian countries - Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Democratic Republic of Congo - made it clear that the 1959 unilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan is null and void.

After a gruelling debate past midnight on April 14, 2010, the riparian countries admitted that they could not reach any agreement on the allocation of the Nile waters. As a result, the seven upstream countries stated that they had decided to move on to the next stage of signing the agreement, beginning May 14, 2010. This will remain open for signing not more than one year. Subsequent to that, the countries will engage in the ratification process.

It seems that the seven countries are determined to have their own agreement and form a permanent Nile Basin Commission.

The idea laboured on for years was to create an understanding and unity among all countries sharing the River Nile when the commission was finally established. Thus, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was established in 1999, with the objective of avoiding conflict and building cooperation in the Nile Basin. For the first time, it brought all 10 riparian countries together. This was in itself a positive sign, for previous initiatives excluded main riparian countries such as Ethiopia.

However, the NBI is a transitional agreement on a potential equitable sharing of the Nile waters until a permanent legal framework is in place.

The initiative has the objective of developing the Nile water resources in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure development, peace, and security. Its emphasis on the words "peace" and "security" shows the assigned role given for the NBI to avoid any real or potential water conflict in the basin.

Its two governing water sharing and allocation deals are derived from the 1997 international trans-boundary water law principles of "equitable utilisation" and "no appreciable harm." However, it is not easy to reconcile the divergent meanings attached to these principles. Apparently, Ethiopia supports the “equitable utilisation,” while Egypt supports the “no appreciable harm” principle.

Historically, the power struggle was at the centre of the Nile Basin.

The maxim that says "he who controls the Nile controls Egypt" triggered the Egyptian leaders to control the Nile Basin by any means. In the 19th Century, the then Egyptian President, Mohammed Ali, launched a hegemonic strategy, the "Unity of the Nile Valley," a resources capture tactic to bring Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya under the umbrella of Egypt.

On the other hand, in the 13th and 15th centuries there were many occasions that Emperors of Ethiopia - Gebre meskel Lalibela, Ne’akuto Le’Ab, Amda Tsiyon, Dawit, and Zar’a Yacob - tried to use the Nile as a weapon in their foreign relations with Egypt. These kings were known to have threatened to block the flow of water for various reasons.

Power has always played a critical role in the past cooperation attempts in the Nile Basin, such as Hydromet, Undugu, and TECCONILE. Egypt, as a hegemonic state, shaped and is trying to shape, the nature and objective of the cooperation ever since the 1960s. The upper riparian countries lost interest in their participation as the Egyptians were dominating and dictating the cooperation by "the virtue of their technical and legal expertise and relative economic and political influence, coupled with Egypt's military strength."

In the past, the upper riparian countries, particularly Ethiopia, avoided Egypt's influence by not taking part in pre-NBI cooperation. Waterbury, a renowned water scholar, described Ethiopia's measure as "a diplomatic tactic of aggressive silence."

This has been a demonstration of Ethiopia's exercise of soft power, as opposed to a display of hard power which uses political, military, and economic coercion to influence the behaviour of the other state. First coined by the well-known Joseph Nye (Prof) of Harvard, a decade ago, soft power has only recently been acknowledged.

States, people, and the international community are often attracted to shared values, international principles, and justice. Hence, the achievements of soft power also depend on the ability of making the other party "less attractive or unattractive," according to Nye.

The NBI is a forum where the riparian countries test and exercise their soft power. It is serving as a diplomatic war arena between the Nile Council of Ministers. That is why the tug-of-war is today being fought in the spacious rooms of the NBI far from the jungle of the Nile Basin.

For instance, Egypt tries to speed up projects that are related to the environment and flooding, while it delays those projects related to water sharing and apportionment. Ethiopia mainly uses soft power to challenge Egypt's hegemony.

Ethiopia and the other upstream countries are always asserting the principle of "equitable utilisation," accepted by the 1997 International Fresh Water Convention. On the contrary, Egypt is asserting the principle of "historic rights," rights that emanate from the 1959 bilateral agreement, which hardly has any international legal reasoning. As a result, Ethiopia's case has become more attractive in recent years, while Egypt's is becoming less attractive, as it always clings to a less acceptable principle and archaic agreements.

In the Nile's Cooperative Framework, international donor communities are eager to see the signing of a new Nile Waters Agreement, which the project has been trying to come up with. But Egypt, followed by Sudan, is determined to maintain the status quo, which is becoming less acceptable and less attractive these days, not only for the riparian countries but also, to some extent, for the NBI major donors and international consultants. The fear is that the status quo may aggravate the calamities of climet change.

The unfair nature of the 1959 agreement is self-explanatory from its title, "Agreement for the Full Utilisation of the Nile Waters," even if the Nile belongs to 10 countries.

Recognising the subtle and gradual power tilt, some Egyptians are airing their dissatisfaction. Hasan Nafa (Prof), of the political science department at Cairo University, is among a group of increasingly discontented Egyptian elite.

"Egypt no longer carries a portion of its former weight in the Nile Basin," he recently wrote in the Al-Ahram Weekly, the leading English language newspaper in Egypt.

Another Egyptian water expert, Magdi Subhi, who works at the Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies, expressed his worries to a daily Arabic language newspaper published in Beirut that "the Egyptian official and political action in the Nile Basin region is very weak."

Ethiopia is currently employing a strategy to challenge Egypt's entrenched hegemony. It is using active diplomacy. This is the first successful coherent act of defiance to a dominant Egypt. In the past, there was no such unanimity among upper riparian states. They (especially Rwanda, Tanzania, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo) either used to show indifference or took shilly-shallying positions.

Their delegates acted differently two weeks ago. For the first time, they were not only questioning the legitimacy of but also vehemently opposing Egypt's assertion of its "historic right." The upper riparian states may not force Egypt and Sudan to sign the new treaty, but they certainly will make it extremely difficult not to do so.

Ethiopia has become more attractive to the donor community lately. There has been increasing financial support to Ethiopia's water resource development from donors. This development is also related to Ethiopia's involvement in the antiterrorism war in the Horn of Africa. Somalia, a failed state for almost two decades, is believed to be a recruiting ground for Al-Qaeda. In 2007, The Guardian reported that after September 11, 2000, Ethiopia has sought to position itself as a key US ally in the global war on terror.

"Ethiopia is the linchpin to the Horn of Africa," David Shinn, former United States ambassador to Ethiopia and currently an adjunct professor of international affairs at Georgetown University, said. "What happens there impacts the rest of the region."

The most important point that has to be emphasised in the negotiations of the Nile Waters Agreement is the quality of the experts and harmonious relationships among the Ethiopian negotiators.

Ethiopia's Nile Technical Advisory Committee is composed of experts drawn from government officials, academia, and the private sector. The Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has not selected the negotiators for their political affiliations but for their expertise and rich experiences. Though officials from the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) are the major negotiators, the team includes the best water scholars in the country. This is worth appreciating.

Those negotiating on the Nile have not simply criticised the government from a distance. Rather, they have been involved in negotiations and are making a huge difference. It is not to say that they are working hand in glove. They put aside their differences, putting national interests first and focusing on long-lasting benefits for the country. As a result, the government, with the support of the technocrats in the water sector, is showing improvements in its bargaining position.

The steady and subtle balance of bargaining power is surfacing in the NBI, particularly in challenging the status quo. This was evident at the ministerial meeting held in Sharm El-Sheikh. Ethiopia, as a leading negotiator among the upper riparian countries, should be applauded for getting the support of the other six. Its active diplomacy paid off, at last.

Though we all want basin-wide, all-inclusive agreement and cooperation, a seven upper riparian country vote would challenge and shorten the unnecessarily inflated image of the lower riparian countries.

At the Sharm El-Sheikh meeting, it was shown that Egyptian power is not incontestable. And it was also demonstrated that it has no veto power anymore. In fact, Egypt is going to be less attractive and acceptable in the face of looming climate change, international law, and the donor community.


* Wondwosen Michago is a post graduate student at Oxford in Water Science, Policy, and Management and former researcher in the Ethiopian Nile Basin Dialogue Forum